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NOTES AND COMMENTS
What Is A Life Worth ?
By RACHEL R. ALLEN
Rachel R. Allen: A. B. University of
Denver, 1949; Education certificate
University of Denver, 1951; taught
in Denver public schools; expects
to graduate from University of
Denver College of Law and take
Colorado Bar examination June,
1958.
The State of Colorado by law declares that no life is worth
more than $10,000.00. Section two of Colorado's wrongful death
statute defines wrongful death,, and section three provides,
"and in every such action the jury may give such damages
as they deem fair and just, not exceeding ten thousand dollars,
with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such
death, to the surviving parties, who may be entitled to sue;
and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances attending any such wrongful act, neglect, or de-
fault. 
2
At common law there was no civil remedy against one who
tortiously caused the death of another; the wrongful death action
is purely a creature of statute. Death acts have been adopted by all
of the states and although the statutory regulations in regard to
damages are distinctive in each jurisdiction, all of the wrongful
death statutes are modeled upon the first law of this type, Lord
Campbell's Act, adopted in England in 1846.2
The first Colorado statute to authorize wrongful death actions
was unanimously enacted by the 1872 session of the territorial legis-
lature.4 That act did not limit the amount which might be recov-
ered as damages in death cases.2 However, in 1877 the law was
revised to read almost as it does today and to add a provision limit-
ing damages recoverable to a maximum of $5,0006. The 1877 statute
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.1-2 (1953).
l Id. § 41-1-3.
S 5tat. 9, 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
4Colo. H. Jour. 9th Sess. (1872).
5 Colo. Sess. Laws 342 (1872).
C Colo. Sess. Laws c. 877 §§ 1-3 (1877).
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further provided, as does the present law, a minimum recovery of
$3,000 applicable only where the death was wrongfully caused by a
common carrier. 7 How much support these original limits had
will probably never be known since, according to the Library of
Congress, there were no legislative journals printed for the first
session of the Colorado General Assembly of 1877. The $5,000 limita-
tion remained unchanged until 1951 when the General Assembly
raised the maximum damages to $10,000.8 This act, House Bill No. 78,
was introduced on January 18, 1951, and assigned to the Judiciary
Committee. It was reported favorably from this committee and
passed without opposition in the House or Senate.9 If there were
attempts either to raise the maximum figure provided by the bill,
or to oppose raising the $5,000 limit, they were confined to commit-
tee sessions.
Colorado is by no means the only American jurisdiction
to restrict damages recoverable for wrongful death by the de-
vice of a statutory maximum limit. Thirteen sister states," and
Alaska', have similar limitations, but only Maine 12 has a ceiling as
low as that in Colorado. Even Maine, with its $10,000 general limita-
tion on damages for wrongful death, must be considered more
liberal than Colorado in this regard; for the Maine statute allows
recovery of reasonable medical, hospital and funeral expenses as
well as damages for conscious suffering prior to death, all in ad-
dition to the basic $10,000 maximum for the wrongful death proper. ' :
Indiana limits recovery in wrongful death actions to $15,000,
and if there is no surviving spouse, dependent child, or dependent
next of kin, to $1,000 for hospital services, $1,000 for medical serv-
ices, $1,000 for burial expenses, and $1,000 for administrator's ex-
penses and attorney's fees.'" New Hampshire limits damages to
7Id. § 1.
8Colo. Sess. Laws, c. 50 §§ 1-3 (1951).
9 Colo. H. Jour. 38th Gen. Ass. (1951).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 1, 2 (Supp. 1955); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-404 (iBurns, Supp. 1955); Kan.
Gen. Stat. 1 60-3203 (1949); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 165, if 9-10 (1954); Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 229,
91 1-2 (Supp. 1953); Mo. Rev. Stat. if 537.070-80 (Supp. 1955); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 556,
§§ 9.13 (1955); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (1953); S. D. Code, § 37.22 (Supp. 1952); Va. Code,
§ 8-633-636 (Supp. 1954); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5474-6 (Michil's Supp. 1955); Wis. Stat. § 331-.03-04
(1955).
11 Alaska Camp. Laws Ann. if 60-73 (1949).
12 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 165 §5 9-10 (1954).
18 Ibid.
14 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-404 (Burns, Supp. 1955).
Lunch With
the koc4ybilt Sstem
of Denver
24 HOUR BREAKFAST AND LUNCH SERVICE
At 1649 Broadway Denver
DICTA
Jan.-Feb., 1957
$7,500 unless the decedent left a widow, a widower, minor child
or children, or dependent father or mother, in which case the
maximum is $15,000.' In Wisconsin, where damages recoverable
for wrongful death are also $15,000, a parent, husband or wife may
in addition recover up to $2,500 for loss of society, and a widow
with dependent children under fifteen years of age may recover
$1,500 above the maximum for each child, but not exceeding a
total increase of $7,500.1" Minnesota courts may award up to $17,500
in a death action, as may the courts of Oregon.'; South Dakota,
West Virginia and Massachusetts have statutes limiting maximum
damages to $20,000 in this type of action.'5 Massachusetts more
strictly limits recovery against a common carrier to $15,000.'
Damages of $25,000 are allowed in Kansas, Missouri, and Virginia.2'1
Illinois allows $25,000 in damages, except that where no widow or
next of kin survives the decedent, a substitute action may be
brought by the executor or administrator for hospital, medical, and
funeral expenses incident to the wrongful death, and up to $450
may be awarded for each such claim.
2
Alaska in allowing up to $50,000 sets a higher maximum than
does any state having a ceiling on wrongful death awards. In
Alaska the action inures to the exclusive benefit of the widow,
surviving husband and children of the decedent or, if none, to the
children of the decedent's child or children, and the surviving par-
ent or parents of the decedent .
2
2
The other states, the territory of Hawaii, and the District of
Columbia have no maximum limitations on damages recoverable in
wrongful death actions. In fact the constitutions of Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah forbid
limitation of damages for wrongful death.
2 -"
Only Massachusetts 2' and Rhode Island 2 ' seem to conclude that
any life must be worth $2,000 or $2,500 by employing these respect-
ive minimum limits in death actions. Colorado's only minimum is
the $3,000 punitive award in actions against common carriers.
2
1
Not only is the wrongful death limit in Colorado the lowest in
the nation, but Colorado is equally conservative in two other as-
pects of wrongful death litigation. First, although the statute
authorizes suit by the decedent's husband, wife or "If there be no
husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue within one year after
such death, then by the heir or heirs of the deceased . "27 the
15N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. . 556, §§ 9-13 (1955).
I1; Wis. Stat. § 331.03-04 (1955).
17 Minn. Stat. § 573-02 (1953); Or, Rev. Slat. 4 830.020 (1953).
1t Mass. Ann. Laws c. 229, §§ 1-2 (Supp. 1953); S. D. Code § 37.22 (Supp. 1952); W. Va.
Code Ann.§ 5474.5-6 (Michil's Supp. 1955).
11 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 229, §§ 1-
2
c (Supp. 1953).'
20 Kan. Gen. Stat. § 69-3203 (1949); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.070-80 (Supp. 1955); Va. Code
8-633-636 (Supp. 1954).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 70, §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1955).
22 Alaska Camp. Laws Ann. §§ 60-73 (1949).
23 Ar z. Const. Art. II, § 31; Ark. Const. Art. 5, § 32; Kv. Const. § 241; N. Y. Const. Art. I,
16; Ohio Const. Art. I, § 19a; Okla. Const. Art. XXIII, § 7; Utah Const. Art. 16, § 5.
24Moss. Ann. Laws, c 229, §§ 1-2c (Supp. 1953).
,,, R. I. Gen. Laws, c. 477 § 1 (1938).
'w Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1-1 (1953).
-7 Ibid.
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words "heir or heirs" have been narrowly construed to restrict the
right of action to lineal descendents if there is no surviving hus-
band or wife.28 Second, the statute itself provides that the action
must be brought within two years after commission of the wrong-
ful act rather than within two years after the death which gives
rise to the cause of action.
2
1
A more important consideration in regard to the subject of
damages is the extreme conservatism of the Colorado supreme court
in construing the statutory directive to consider "mitigating and
aggravating circumstances attending" the wrongful act. ' 2 Even
though the phrase "mitigating and aggravating circumstances" is
ordinarily interpreted to authorize punitive or exemplary damages,: 1
the Colorado court has limited wrongful death recoveries to actual
or compensatory damages.3-2 In 1892 the court decided that the
degree of negligence and the intent involved in the commission of
the wrongful act are not to be considered in determining the amount
of damages to be awarded, that such damages are compensatory
only, and that "the words mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attending such wrongful act, etc. contemplate circumstances, not
relating to the wrongful act itself, but such as affect the actual
damages suffered by the surviving party entitled to sue, either by
way of diminishing or enhancing the same. '"3 These cases seem to
be controlling even today.2
Colorado courts apparently have encountered trouble in de-
termining the proper measure of damages for wrongful death ever
since the enactment of the original wrongful death act of 1872 .3
In 1874 the Colorado Supreme court said:
"in actions brought by one to recover for injuries sustained
through the negligence or misconduct of another, mental an-
guish and sufferings are legitimate subjects for compensation.
.... (S) o, too, when the injury has been the result of wanton-
28 Hindry v. Holt, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721 (1894).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1-4 (1953).
30 Id. § 41-1-2.
31 Tiffany, Death By Wrongful Act § 139 (2d ed. 1913).
22 Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 Pac. 348 (1892); Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 Pac.
352 (1892).
33 Moffat v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 198, 30 Pac. 348 (1892).
34 Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P. 2d 930 (1949) (leading wrongful death and survival
case which referred to the 1892 cases cited in note 32 supra).
3 Colo. Sess. Laws 117 (1872).
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ness, violence, or gross negligence, punitive damages have been
awarded."30
Two years later the same court said that compensatory damages
might be awarded under the 1872 statute and that there was also
a right to exemplary damages where there was willful misconduct
or entire want of care.3 7 Then in 1878 the court stated, in deciding
a case brought under the 1872 act, and heard by the appellate court
after the passage of the 1877 act,38 "Whatever may be said of the
act approved March 7, 1877, the act of February 8, 1872, is not to
be regarded in any proper sense as a penal statute.
3 t
Since enactment of the 1877 act the courts have held that the
sections in regard to common carriers are punitive but that those
applicable to non-carriers are merely compensatory. 40 Thus in a
1914 interpretation of the provision for a minimum recovery against
common carriers, the state supreme court reasoned,
"The fact that no matter how young or old, how infirm or use-
less the deceased, the recovery for his death, under this pro-
vision is precisely the same, depending on the defendant's
failure of duty, as it would be had he been in the prime of life,
having the highest capabilities and attainments, mentally and
physically, demonstrates with unerring certainty the purpose
of the legislature to make it a punitory section pure and
simple."
4'
In awarding damages for wrongful death in actions brought
under sections other than the common carrier sections the court
has held that a proper measure of damages for wrongful death
is the pecuniary benefit which could reasonably have been expected
to accrue to the person suing by the continued life of the decedent,
as of grace and favor if not by right.42 For example, the estimated
future pecuniary benefit to parents of a deceased minor child
before the child's majority and also during the parents' anticipated
old age, constitute elements of compensable damages.4 3 The court
has denied recovery for the physical and mental pain, bodily dis-
figurement, and loss of time suffered by the deceased before his
death as a result of the defendant's wrongful act, 44 and for grief
and sorrow caused surviving relatives by the death.4 It was said in
an early case that ,"the recovery allowable is in no sense a solatium
for grief of the living occasioned by the death of the relative or
friend, however dear.... (T) his may seem cold and mercenary but
it is unquestionably the law."'
36 Kansas Poe. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442, 464-5 (1874).
37 Kansas Poe. Ry. Co. v. Lunden, 3 Colo. 94 (1876).
38 See note 6 supra.
39 Denver Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 168 (1878).
40 See note 6 supra.
41 Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Frederick, 57 Colo. 90, 96, 140 Pac. 463 (1914); accord Myers v.
Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 302, 157 Pac. 196 (1916).
42 McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263, P. 2d 313 (1953); St. Lukes Hospital Ass'n. v. Long,
125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952); Molly Gibson Consol. Min. & Mil. Co, v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App.
321, 38 Poe. 850 (1894); Denver 5. R. R. v. Wilson, 12 Colo. 20, 20 Poe. 340 (1888).
43 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n. v. Long, supra note 42.
44 Lee v. City of Fort Morgan, 77 Colo. 135, 235 Poe. 348 (1926).
45 Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Poe. 721 (1894); accord, Tehrer v. Tarenzen, 124 Colo.
17, 233 P. 2d 382 (1951).
40 Pierce v. Conners, supra note 45 at 182, 37 Poe. at 730.
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In emphasizing that these non-carrier sections allow only com-
pensatory damages the court has held that giving the jury instruc-
tions on damages which omit the caveat that an award is limited to
pecuniary loss and is compensatory', constitutes reversible error.
4 7
The problem of adequately defining compensatory damages appears
to trouble the courts today as it did in an 1884 personal injuries case
where the court stated,
"A misapprehension seems sometimes to exist as to the word
compensatory .... (U) nder the rule limiting them to compen-
satory damages, juries will, with proper instructions, recognize
a broad distinction between a tort unaccompanied by malice,
or circumstances of aggravation or disgrace, and one producing
equal direct pecuniary damage where either of these conditions
exist. In the former case consider only the actual injury to
the person or property, including expenses, loss of time, bodily
suffering etc., occasioned by the wrongful act; in the latter,
they allow such additional sum as in their judgment is war-
ranted by the circumstances of contumely, anguish or oppres-
sion; but in both instances the damages are awarded as com-
pensation; the additional sum is given to the individual as a
recompense for the mental suffering, or wounded sensibilities,
etc., as the case may be.
4
That funeral expenses are a proper element of the damages
to be recovered under the wrongful death act, within the ten thou-
sand dollar maximum, is well established. 49 However, there seems to
have been some conflict in regard to whether an action could be
brought, separate from the wrongful death action, to collect for
funeral costs. In a 1940 case, the Colorado court held that funeral
expenses are a proper element of damages for wrongful death, but
that they do not form the basis for a separate cause of action.r'"
Yet the same court, in 1954, allowed the administratrix of an estate,
where there were no "heirs" entitled to bring suit under the wrong-
ful death act to recover in an action brought for funeral expenses,
47 Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Spencer. 25 Colo. 9, 52 Poe. 211 (1898).
48 Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 547-8. 5 Poe. 119, 123-4 (1884).
49 McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461. 263 P. 2d 313 (1953); Dillon v. Sterling Rend. Works, 106
Colo. 407, 106 P. 2d 358 (1940).
-50 Dillon v. Sterling Rend. Works, supra note 53.
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on the theory that this was not an action for personal injury to the
decedent, but rather an action to recover money of which the estate
had been deprived.5t
For many years the Colorado courts have sought to define
clearly the proper relationship between the wrongful death statute
and the survival statute. American Insurance Company v. Naylor, -
a 1937 case, presents one of the more interesting situations litigated
under the survival statute. The plaintiff Naylor, before commencing
this action under the survival act, had recovered $4,000 under the
wrongful death statute to compensate him for the wrongful death
of his wife, caused by an agent of the defendant. The court held
that such recovery did not preclude another action by the same
plaintiff under the survival statute for medical expenses incurred
after the accident but before his wife's death. In addition Mr.
Naylor was awarded damages for the loss of his wife's services,
companionship, and society during the three months between the
wife's injury and death. In 1939 the court, in a second appeal of
the same case, held that the loss of a wife's services and companion-
ship to a husband and the money spent by a husband caring for
the wife's injuries, occurring as a result of the defendant's wrongful
act against the wife, constitute a personal injury to the husband for
which he may recover, and awarded interest on the damages allowed
in the previous case, 53 under the statute providing interest in per-
sonal injury tort actions.
5 4
The 1955 legislature amended the survival statute to read,
"All causes of action, except for slander or libel and actions
brought for the recovery of real estate, shall survive and may be
brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person
in favor of or against whom such action has accrued, but puni-
tive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged ...
in tort actions based upon personal injuries, the damages
recoverable after the death of the person in whose favor such
action has accrued shall be limited to loss of earnings and ex-
51 Kling v. Phayer, 130 Colo. 158, 274 P. 2d 97 (1954).
-American Ins. Co. v- Naylor, 101 Colo. 41, 70 P. 2d 349 (1937).
:.3 American Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 103 Colo. 461, 87 P. 2d 260 (1939).
5.1 Col . Rev. Stat. Ann § 41-2-1 (1953).
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penses sustained or incurred prior to death, and shall not include
damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement, nor prospective
profits or earnings after death. An action under this section
shall not preclude an action for wrongful death under article
one, chapter forty-one of the Colorado Revised Statutes.' 55
The amendment of the out moded survival statute has been
favorably noted.56 As yet there are no reported cases construing
the amended statute, but it would seem that proper application
of the new law would help remedy a few of the defects of the
wrongful death statute, as well as give justice to those injured by a
tort-feasor who dies before the injured party can be recompensed.
It should now be possible for surviving relatives of a person wrong-
fully killed to collect in addition to a possible $10,000 for the wrong-
ful death, all of the expenses occasioned by the fatal injury, and
for an administrator, prohibited from suing under the wrongful
death statute, to preserve the estate by siiing under the survival
statute. The worst defect of the wrongful death statute, the $10,000
maximum limitation on damages will, however, remain.
A life worth $10,000 in Colorado might be thought to be worth
$300,000 by a jury in New York. In De Vito v. United Airlines,5
the jury, in an action for wrongful death, gave an award of $300,000
which was reduced by the trial judge to $160,000. In California a
jury might find the same life worth $200,000. In 1953 a California
trial judge reduced a jury award of $200,000 to $150,000 in a wrong-
ful death case.5 8 A verdict of $150,000 was sustained by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a case in which
the decedent was killed in a plane crash.55 . In a 1952 New York
case, the decedent was a thirty-nine year old brakeman survived
by a thirty-one year old widow and five children. Out of the total
award of $141,500, $116,500 was awarded for death, and $25,000 for
conscious pain and suffering prior to death from the injuries
sustained. 0 In two other New York cases, damages were $195,888
reducted to $100,000 in one, 6 and $165,000 in Lhe other.2 In an
interesting California case, the decedent was a thirty-five year old
army sergeant earning $330 a month who was survived by a thirty-
five year old wife and a seven and a half year old child. The
damages awarded were $100,000.83
Another high award case in New York was Neddo v. New York,
in which a twenty-nine year old man earning $15,000 a year left
a widow with a life expectancy of thirty-six years. The Appellate
55"Cola. Rev. Stat. Ann. 152-1-9 (Supp. 1955).
56 Note, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 87 (1955).
517 De Vito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
58 Buck v. Hill, 121 Cal. App. 413, 263 P. 2d 643 (1st Dist. Ct. of App. 1953).
55 Kendall v. United Airlines, 200 F. 2d 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
60 New Haven and Hartford Co. v. Zeramini, 200 F. 2d 240 (Ist Cir. 1952).
61 Summerville v. Smucker, 280 App. Div. 839, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 868 (2d Dept. 1952).
62 Pike v. Consolidated Edison Co., 277 App. Div. 1120, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 892 (2d Dept. 1948);
new trial granted, 303 N.Y. 1, 99 N.E. 2d 885 (1950).
63 Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P. 2d 48 (1st Dist. Ct. of App. 1951).
SACHS-LlWLOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS- ALPInE 5-3422
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Division, in affirming an award of $137,566.74, said, "Where the
evidence fairly sustains the verdict, the courts are not empowered
to declare it excessive upon some economic theory that there must
be a limit to a verdict in a death case. ' 64 In another case, where
the decedent had a life expectancy of tweny-five years, earnings
of $4,400 the last year of life, and was survived by a thirty-seven
year old widow and seven children, a Pennsylvania federal district
court allowed an award of $100,000 reduced to $80,000 upon a
finding of 20 per cent contributory negligence. "- The supreme court
of North Dakota recently affirmed an award of $55,502.03 where
the deceased, a husband and the father of three minor children, had
a life expectancy of over forty years and earnings of from $200-$250
a month. 6 The supreme court of New Mexico affirmed on appeal
a verdict of $50,000 in a case where the decedent, a twenty-four
year old truck driver and structural steel worker, had been wrong-
fully killed."?
A few personal injury awards deserve notice because the re-
lationship of personal injury and wrongful death cases is close, and
awards in other jurisdictions are of particular interest in evaluat-
ing the proper measure of damages for both types of cases in
Colorado. In Watson v. Florida Power and Light Company,6 dam-
ages of $260,000 were awarded by a Florida tribunal for personal
injuries. A plumber who was permanently injured when a pipe on
which he was working blew up in his face, was awarded $250,000
in a New Jersey action."" In a 1954 California case, a seventeen
year old boy received $97,000 for serious injuries67 0 and in another
recent decision from California, a pedestrian on a railroad platform
who suffered serious injury when struck by an engine overhang
was awarded $25,000 in damages by the jury.71 In Hildebrand v.
United States,7 2 $65,489 was awarded the plaintiff for injuries
64 Neddo v. New York, 275 App. Div. 492, 501, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 650, 656 (3d Dept. 1949).
65 Thomas v. Conemaugh Black Lick R. R., 133 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
66 Geier v. Tjaden, 74 N.W. 2d 361 (N.D. 1955).
67 Hall v. Stiles, 57 N.M. 281, 258 P. 2d 386 (1953).
6 Watson v. Florida Power and Light Co., 50 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1951).
69 Keiffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F. 2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952).
70 Hawk v. City of Newport Beach, 286 P. 2d 481 (4th Dist. Ct. of App. 1954), off'd., 293 P.
2d 48 (Calif. 1956).
71 Gibson v. Southern Poc. Co., 290 P. 2d 347 (Ist Dist. Ct. of App. Cal. 1955).
.2 Hildebrand v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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including a fractured wrist requiring corrective surgery, and a
compression fracture of certain vertebrae with subsequent surgery.
In a Florida malpractice suit, where the defendant had un-
successfully employed the Koch method of treatment on the
plaintiff's lip in treating a malignant growth which then spread
into the full lip and chin, the plaintiff was awarded $65,000 in
damages.7 3 A 1955 New Mexico decision, Thompson v. Anderman'7
awarded a thirteen year old boy with a low mentality, $54,000 for
serious injuries likely to cause epileptic seizures. The Texas Court
of Appeals sustained a verdict of $50,000 in another 1955 case where
the plaintiff, a fifty-year old deputy sheriff, suffered ruptured
muscles, a ruptured disc with nerve involvement and sciatic pain,
chip fractures of the fifth and sixth vertebrae, a ruptured eardrum
and a broken nose.
7
5
Damages awarded for personal injuries in Colorado are not
usually high. However, in Cahall v. Colorado Wyoming Railroad
Company, 71 a thirty-eight year old brakeman earning $200 a month,
received $84,584 in damages for the loss of his left hand and right
forearm. $75,000 was awarded in a 1952 Colorado case, to a mental
patient who fell or jumped from a hospital window and suffered
paralysis from the waist downj 7 but the decision was later re-
versed for want of evidence of future loss of earnings. In Riss &
Company v. Anderson,-, the plaintiff was awarded $23,303.50, in a
case against his employer, a railroad company. In another railroad
case an award of $15,000 to a fifty-two year old Colorado section
hand was held not to be excessive.7' The Colorado supreme court
awarded $33,918 in damages in a 1955 case, to a plaintiff who had
suffered a ruptured vertebrae of the neck.", A $250,000 suit for
damages for personal injuries was settled out of court in November
of this year in Denver District Court, for $50,000 cash. $48,000 of
73 Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1954).
74 Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P. 2d 507 (1955).
75 Prater v. Holbrook, 283 S.W. 2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
76 CahilI v. Colorado & Wyoming Ry., U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Colo., Civ. No. 3352 (10th Cir.
1952).
77 United States v. Gray, 199 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
,8 Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78, 114 P. 2d 278 (1941).
79 Denver & Salt Lake R. R. v. Granier, 104 Colo. 131, 89 P. 2d 245 (1939).
80 Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P. 2d 427 (1955).
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this settlement was for injuries suffered by one of the three plain-
tiffs, who will, as a result of her injuries received in an automobile
collision, be confined to a wheel chair for the rest of her life. The
ohter two plaintiffs received minor injuries in the same accident.'
Had the injured plaintiff in any of the six Colorado cases listed
above died of his injuries, his dependents would have been able to
collect, at the most, $10,000 in damages. Clearly it is more eco-
nomical in Colorado to kill than merely maim.
In the past twenty years, Alaska and all of the states with
statutory limits on damages for wrongful death have raised their
maximum limits as shown in the following chart:
STATE
A lask a ----------------
Colorado -----------
Illin ois --..----.......
Indiana ------..
K ansas ---------
M aine ............
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri ......
New Hampshir
Oregon
South Dakota
Virginia .........
West Virginia
Wisconsin .
1935 limit " -
- --.. ------------------.----- $ 1 0 ,0 0 0
- -----------------------  $ 5 ,0 0 0
......... ...........  $ 10,000
... ..... ................ -$ 1 0 ,0 00
----.. - ------------------. --.$ 1 0 ,0 0 0
--..------.-. . ...$ 5 ,0 0 0
-----------------  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0
.............. ... .... ..............-$ 7 ,5 0 0
. .$10,000
e . . ... . .. . ......... ......-$ 10 ,0 0 0
$ 7,500
------. -  -- --- - $ 10 ,0 00
........  ... ... .... ....-$ 1 0 ,0 0 0
.. .. . ...........  ... -$ 1 0 ,0 0 0
-..------ ... ...-.- . ... .$ 10 ,0 0 0
1955 limit-
$50,000
$10,000
$25,000
$15,000
$25,000
$10,000
$20,000
$17,500
$25,000
$15,000
$17,500
$20,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
It should be noted that Colorado with its $5,000 limit, was in
1935 most conservative in its ceilings on damages, as it is today.
The District of Columbia and Connecticut had limits of $10,000
on death awards in 1935, but today have no statutory provisions
limiting damages."4 Virginia has twice raised her maximum limit
on damages since 1935 and Alaska currently allows five times as
great as award as was permitted twenty years ago.
Melvin M. Belli in his book Modern Trials observes that
awards in wrongful death cases have increased more than in any
other particular type of case. Some states still arbitrarily restrict
the amount of the death award, although no justifiable reason,
economic, moral or social, presents itself. Mr. Belli says, "Some
states, with statutory limitations have raised the amount, but so
niggardly, that one must conclude the purpose of the offered
gratuity was actually to forestall an attempt completely to remove
all statutory restrictions in the particular jurisdiction."8' , Professor
McCormick has noted that under an old Anglo-Saxon law each man
had his price according to his rank which had to be paid to his
81 Huber Y. Scheler and John Deere Plow Co., Colo. Dist. Ct., 2d Judic. Dist., Civ. No. B-2555(1956).
R2 McCormick, Damages 385 (1935).
83 See notes 10 & 11 supro.
.4 See note 82 supro.
.95 Be,,,, Modern Trials, § 411 (1954).
A6 Id. at 2541.
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next of kin if he were slain, and has compared this old idea with
the fixed sum recovery limits in some American death acts."7
Further, he asserted:
"It may be supposed that such limitations were political con-
cessions made to the opponents of the original acts which
introduced liability for death and that they were conceded
because of a general mistrust that juries might allow exorbi-
tant sums for fatal injuries for which no doctrines for meas-
uring damage had been charted.""8
In considering the Colorado wrongful death act and its history,
several items are of interest. If there was any opposition to the
original death act, such opposition was not vocal,"9 and the fact
that no limit on damages was included in the law should be noted."
What influence caused the 1877 legislature to limit the damages
in death actions91 is open to speculation, possibly a general mis-
trust of juries, or the effect of an insurance lobby.
Mr. Belli has stated that private insurance companies in Cali-
fornia advocated, in advertising to prospective jurors, that awards
should be cut or the insurance companies would "go broke" and
insurance would soon cost "more than you can pay." This adver-
tising was not, according to Mr. Belli, joined in by all private
insurance companies. Mr. Belli suggests that perhaps with revalua-
tion of premums there will have to be, likewise, a more efficient
operation, with less of the premium dollar going to the companies."
The effect on damages of changes in the economy is well stated
in a recent law review note, "If the economy is marked by gradually
rising costs, verdicts based on today's wages and costs and ideas
of the value of money will naturally tend to exceed verdicts of a
decade or more ago."9 3 The article mentions that the courts should
take into account well known and apparently permanent changes
in the purchasing power of money and points out that statutory
limits in death actions make no more sense than in actions for
87 See note 82 supro.
88 Ibid.
8e Cola. H. Jour. 9th Sess. (1872).
90 Colo. Laws at 342 (1872).
91 Colo. Laws c. 877 §§ 1-3 (1877).
92 See note 85 supra at 2542.
98 James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 Cornell L.Q. 582 at 605 (1956).
DICTA
Jan.-Feb., 1957
personal injuries and cannot be justified in view of changes in
amounts of verdicts in states where no statutory limits exist.9 4 An
article in the Louisiana Law Review points out that if counsel can
show that the recovery in his case is excessive or inadequate in
view of the actual change of the purchasing power of the dollar,
the court will probably adjust the award on that basis.9 5 Using
the figures given by the United States Bureau of Labor statistics,
a verdict of $5,000 in 1916 should have been $11,905 in 1951 if
increased equally with rises in cost of living. On the basis of these
figures one must conclude that even in 1951 when the Colorado
Legislature doubled the death award they were oblivious of the
economic change in the situation at that time. That the Colorado
Supreme Court has not always agreed with the legislature as to
the monetary worth of a human life is shown by the fact that
the court in 1917 allowed damages in the amount of $12,500 to a
widow with one child, for the wrongful death of her husband2"
This case was brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
which does not limit damages for wrongful death. It is interesting
to observe that the court awarded damages, in this case, of an
amount two and one-half times greater than the maximum dam-
ages then allowed by the state's wrongful death statute.
From the present state of the law limiting damages in Colorado
wrongful death actions, these conclusions are self evident; that it is
cheaper in Colorado to kill than to injure; that Colorado has the
least progressive and least humane wrongful death law in the
nation; that if the insurance lobby, rather than legislative inertia
and conservatism, is responsible for the $10,000 limit on damages,
that lobby operates in a skillful, subtle manner; that the Colorado
statute is entirely unrealistic in view of the current economic situa-
tion; and that Colorado lags behind all of the other states and
territories in placing a proper value on human life.
It is to be hoped that, during the present session of the Legis-
lature, Colorado's law makers will revise the wrongful death sta-
tute, clarifying its language and bringing it up to date. In the
opinion of this writer the following changes in the law should be
54 Id. at 606-08.
05 Comment, 15 La. L. Rev. 743 (1955).
56 Vallery v. Barrett, 63 Colo. 548, 167 Pac. 979 (1917)
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made: (1) Clarification of the language regarding those entitled
to sue.
The present statute provides that suit may be brought "By
the husband or wife of deceased; or if there be no husband or wife,
or he or she fails to sue within one year after such death, then by
the heir or heirs of the deceased ... ",7
Amendment should eliminate any confusion relating to the
right of the widow or widower to bring an action during the second
year after the wrongful act has occurred. (2) The time limit during
which an action may be brought should begin to run upon occur-
rence of the death, rather than upon the happening of the wrongful
act." . It is conceivable that an injured person could linger upon
the brink of death for two years and one day, in which case the
surviving heirs would be deprived of just damages for his death.
Since, in any case the plaintiffs has the burden of proving the
defendant's wrongful act caused death, it would seem more fair to
allow a period of one or two years after the death for filing the
action. (3) The provision, "having regard to the mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attending any such wrongful act ...
should be eliminated, or the section should be revised to allow
exemplary or punitive damages in which the mitigating or aggra-
vating circumstances would be properly considered. The most
drastically needed reform in the wrongful death act, is the elim-
ination of any maximum limit on recoverable damages. Under our
judicial system, juries, with proper instruction, are deemed capable
of awarding just damages in personal injuries actions and in many
types of contract and tort suits. Why they should be considered
incapable of so doing in death cases is incomprehensible, particul-
arly since the courts may force reduction of jury awards or grant
new trials, where damages awarded are excessive. Should the
Colorado wrongful death act be revised as here suggested, that
act and the survival act together, would provide a realistic and
just basis for attempting to compensate in dollars the loss of human
life.
97 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1-1(a) (b) (1953).
98 Id. 1 4.
99 Id. § 3.
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